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Hermeneutics refers to interpretation and translation of text (typically ancient scriptures)
but also applies to verbal and non-verbal communication. In a psychological setting it
nicely frames the problem of inferring the intended content of a communication. In this
paper, we offer a solution to the problem of neural hermeneutics based upon active inference.
In active inference, action fulfils predictions about how we will behave (e.g., predicting we
will speak). Crucially, these predictions can be used to predict both self and others e during
speaking and listening respectively. Active inference mandates the suppression of pre-
diction errors by updating an internal model that generates predictions e both at fast
timescales (through perceptual inference) and slower timescales (through perceptual learning).
If two agents adopt the same model, then e in principle e they can predict each other and
minimise their mutual prediction errors. Heuristically, this ensures they are singing from
the same hymn sheet. This paper builds upon recent work on active inference and
communication to illustrate perceptual learning using simulated birdsongs. Our focus here
is the neural hermeneutics implicit in learning, where communication facilitates long-
term changes in generative models that are trying to predict each other. In other words,
communication induces perceptual learning and enables others to (literally) change our
minds and vice versa.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
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can invent a coherent story or narrative, but I can never
independently verify my interpretations (Frith & Wentzer,
2013). Nevertheless, people seem to understand each other
most the time. How is this achieved? In this paper, we suggest
the criteria for evaluating and updating my interpretation of
your behaviour are exactly the same criteria that underlie
action and perception in general; namely, theminimisation of
prediction error or (variational) free energy.
In a companion paper (Friston and Frith, 2015), we
considered communication in terms of inference about
others, based on the notion that we model and predict our
sensations e sensations that are generated by other agents
like ourselves. This leads to a view of communication based
on a generative model or narrative that is shared by agents
who exchange sensory signals. Given a shared narrative,
communication can then be cast as turn taking (Wilson &
Wilson, 2005), by selectively attending and attenuating sen-
sory information. Attending to exteroceptive sensations en-
ables the shared narrative to predict the sensory input
generated by another (while listening). Conversely, attenu-
ating exteroceptive input enables one to articulate the narra-
tive by realising proprioceptive predictions (while speaking).
Using simulations, we demonstrated this turn taking by
assuming that both agents possessed the same generative
model. In this paper, we consider how and why generative
models learned by agents e who exchange sensory signals e
become the same (shared) model.
Our underlying premise is that we are trying to model the
causes of our sensations e and adjust those models to
maximise Bayesian model evidence or, equivalently, mini-
mise surprise (Brown & Bru¨n, 2012; Kilner, Friston, & Frith,
2007). This perspective on action and perception has broad
explanatory power in several areas of cognitive neurosci-
ence e and enjoys support from several lines of neuroana-
tomical and neurophysiological evidence (Egner &
Summerfield, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Srinivasan,
Laughlin, & Dubs, 1982). In communication and the inter-
pretation of intent, the very notion of theory of mind speaks
directly to inference, in the sense that theories make pre-
dictions that have to be tested against (sensory) data. Ima-
gine two brains, each mandated to model the (external)
states of the world causing sensory input. Now imagine that
sensations can only be caused by (the action of) one brain on
the other. This means that the first brain has to model the
second. However, the second brain is modelling the first,
which means the first brain must have a model of the sec-
ond brain, which includes a model of the first e and so on ad
infinitum. At first glance, the implicit infinite regress appears
to preclude a veridical modelling of another's brain. How-
ever, this infinite regress dissolves if each brain models the
sensations caused by itself and the other as being generated
in the same way. In other words, if there is a shared narra-
tive or dynamic that both brains subscribe to, then they can
predict each other exactly e at least for short periods of
time. This is the basic idea that we pursue in the context of
active inference and predictive coding.
In our previous paper, we focused on the dynamical phe-
nomena that emerge when two dynamical systems try to
predict each other.Mathematically, this dynamical coupling iscalled generalised synchrony (aka synchronisation of chaos)
(Barreto, Josic, Morales, Sander,& So, 2003; Hunt, Ott,& Yorke,
1997). Generalised synchrony was famously observed by
Huygens in his studies of pendulum clocks e that synchro-
nized themselves through the imperceptible motion of beams
from which they were suspended (Huygens, 1673). This nicely
illustrates the action at a distance among coupled dynamical
systems. Put simply, generalised synchronisation means that
knowing the state of one system (e.g., neuronal activity in the
brain) means one can predict the another system (e.g., an-
other's brain).
We will consider a special case of generalized synchroni-
zation; namely, identical synchronization, in which there is a
one-to-one relationship between the states of two systems.
Identical synchronisation emerges when the systems that are
coupled are the same. In the context of active inference, this
means the two generative models are identical. But why
should two agents have the same generative model? The
answer is rather obvious e when they share the same gener-
ative model they can predict each other more accurately and
minimise their prediction errors or surprise. The key point
here is that the same principle that leads to generalised
synchrony also applies to the selection or learning of the
model generating predictions. This learning is the focus of the
current paper, which provides an illustrative proof of principle
that the hermeneutic cycle can be closed by simply updating
generative models and their predictions to minimise predic-
tion errors. Crucially, these prediction errors can be computed
without ever knowing the true state of another; thereby
solving the problem of hermeneutics (see Fig. 1).
The treatment of communication in this paper is rather
abstract and borrowsmathematical concepts from dynamical
systems theory. Although we will use birdsong as a vehicle to
illustrate the ideas, we do not pretend this is a meaningful
model of linguistic communication (or indeed songbirds).
Rather, we try to understand the dynamic coordination of
richly structured behaviours, such as singing and dancing,
without ascribing any (semantic) meaning or syntax to sen-
sory exchanges. Having said this, there is growing interest in
applying the principles of predictive coding to language: e.g.,
(Arnal & Giraud, 2012; Hickok, 2013; Pickering & Clark, 2014;
Wang, Mathalon, et al., 2014) e and understanding the
algebra of dynamical systems in terms of communication;
e.g., (Scott-Phillips & Blythe, 2013). Furthermore, predictive
coding is starting to shed light on spectral asymmetries e in
coupling within the auditory hierarchy e evident in electro-
physiological studies of speech processing (Arnal, Wyart, &
Giraud, 2011).
This paper comprises five sections. The first sections
reprise the material in (Friston and Frith, 2015), which pro-
vides a brief review of active inference and predictive coding
in communication. In the second section, we described the
particular (birdsong) model used to illustrate communicative
inference. This model has been used previously to illustrate
several phenomena in perception; such as perceptual
learning, repetition suppression, and the recognition of
stimulus streams with deep hierarchical structure (Friston &
Kiebel, 2009; Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008). In the third
section, we provide a simple illustration of omission related
responses e that are ubiquitous in neurophysiology and
Fig. 1 e A predictive coding formulation of the Hermeneutic Circle: e.g., Speech Chain in the setting of language (Denes &
Pinson, 1993). This schematic provides a simple example of neural hermeneutics in the form of a control system diagram. It
is a simple example because the internal (generative) model predicting the behavioural consequences of action (of self and
other) is the same. In other words, it is neither a model of my behaviour or your behaviour e but a model of our behaviour.
When both agents adopt the same model, generalised synchronisation is guaranteed and prediction errors are minimised.
The implicit architecture highlights the fact that the top-down predictions from a dynamical generative model (labelled
Narrative) come in two flavours: exteroceptive predictions predicting the external consequences of action (c.f., corollary
discharge) and proprioceptive predictions that predict the internal consequences of action (c.f., motor commands). These
predictions are compared with sensory input to provide prediction errors. In control diagrams of this sort ⊗ denotes a
comparator. Exteroceptive (e.g., auditory) prediction errors are used to update the generative model at various timescales to
produce inference and learning. In contrast, the proprioceptive prediction errors drive classical reflexes to produce the
predicted action. When the (dynamics of the) generative models in the two brains are identical, both exteroceptive and
proprioceptive prediction errors are minimised and the dynamics will exhibit (generalised) synchrony. The red arrows
denote learning or control by prediction errors that compare (descending) predictions with (ascending) sensations.
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section, we use this model to simulate two (identical) birds
that are singing to themselves (and each other) and examine
the conditions under which generalised synchrony emerges.
In the final section, we repeat the simulations using two birds
that start off with different generative models. We will see
that perceptual learning produces a convergence of the two
generative models over time e leading to the emergence of
generalised synchrony and implicit communication. We offer
this as a solution to the problem of hermeneutic inference
that can be resolved by neuronally plausible schemes e with
the single imperative to minimise prediction error or free
energy.2. Active inference and predictive coding
Recent advances in theoretical neuroscience have produced a
paradigm shift in cognitive neuroscience. This shift is away
from the brain as a passive filter of sensations e or an elabo-
rate stimulus-response link e towards a view of the brain as
an organ that generates hypotheses or fantasies (fantastic:
from Greek phantastikos, the ability to create mental images,
from phantazesthai), which are tested against sensory evidence
(Gregory, 1968). This perspective dates back to the notion of
unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1866/1962) and has been
formalised to cover deep or hierarchical Bayesian inference e
about the causes of our sensations e and how these in-
ferences induce beliefs, movement and behaviour (Clark,2013; Dayan, Hinton, & Neal, 1995; Friston, Kilner, &
Harrison, 2006; Hohwy, 2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003).2.1. Predictive coding and the Bayesian brain
Modern formulations of the Bayesian brain e such as predic-
tive coding e are now among the most popular explanations
for neuronalmessage passing (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2008; Rao&
Ballard, 1999; Srinivasan et al., 1982). Predictive coding is a
biologically plausible process theory for which there is a
considerable amount of anatomical and physiological evi-
dence. In these schemes, neuronal representations e in
higher levels of cortical hierarchies e generate predictions of
representations in lower levels (Friston, 2008; Mumford, 1992;
Rao & Ballard, 1999). These top-down predictions are
compared with representations at the lower level to form a
prediction error (usually associated with the activity of su-
perficial pyramidal cells). The resulting mismatch signal is
passed back up the hierarchy to update higher representa-
tions (associated with the activity of deep pyramidal cells).
This recursive exchange of signals suppresses prediction error
at each and every level to provide a hierarchical explanation
for sensory inputs that enter at the lowest (sensory) level. In
computational terms, neuronal activity encodes beliefs or
probability distributions over states in the world that cause
sensations (e.g., my visual sensations are caused by a face).
The simplest encoding corresponds to representing the belief
with the expected value or expectation of a (hidden) cause.
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inferred from their sensory consequences.
In summary, predictive coding represents a biologically
plausible scheme for updating beliefs about states of the
world using sensory samples: see Fig. 2. In this setting, cortical
hierarchies are a neuroanatomical embodiment of how sen-
sory signals are generated; for example, a face generates
surfaces that generate textures and edges and so on, down to
retinal input. This form of hierarchical inference explains a
large number of anatomical and physiological facts as
reviewed elsewhere (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Bastos
et al., 2012; Friston, 2008). In brief, it explains the hierarchi-
cal nature of cortical connections; the prevalence of backward
connections and many of the functional and structuralFig. 2 e This figure summarizes hierarchical neuronal message
neuroanatomy of a songbird. Neuronal activity encodes expect
expectations minimize prediction error. Prediction error is the
(descending) predictions of that input. Here, sensory input is re
different acoustic frequencies over time. Minimising prediction
different levels of the cortical hierarchy. The available evidence
compare the expectations (at each level) with top-down predict
levels. Left panel: these equations represent the neuronal dynam
th level of the hierarchy are simply the difference between the e
of those expectations. The expectations per se are driven by pre
(precision weighted) prediction error. See the appendix for a de
this figure. Right panel: this provides a schematic example in th
of origin of ascending or forward connections that convey (prec
descending or backward connections (black arrows) that constru
HVC (c.f., high vocal centre), which projects to the auditory tha
predictions to the hypoglossal nucleus, which are passed to the
These predictions can be regarded as motor commands, while
corollary discharge. Note that every top-down prediction is reci
predictions are constrained by sensory information. The neuroa
seriously: we have simply transcribed a generic hierarchical me
cardinal regions implicated in the processing of birdsongs (Notasymmetries in the extrinsic connections that link hierarchi-
cal levels (Zeki & Shipp, 1988). These asymmetries include the
laminar specificity of forward and backward connections, the
prevalence of nonlinear or modulatory backward connections
and their spectral characteristics e with fast (e.g., gamma)
activity predominating in forward connections and slower
(e.g., beta) frequencies that accumulate evidence (prediction
errors) ascending from lower levels.
2.2. Precision engineered message passing
One can regard ascending prediction errors as broadcasting
‘newsworthy’ information that has yet to be explained by
descending predictions. However, the brain has to select thepassing in predictive coding using the (simplified)
ations about the causes of sensory input, where these
difference between (ascending) sensory input and
presented by a sonogram encoding the amplitude of
error rests upon recurrent neuronal interactions among
suggests that superficial pyramidal cells (red triangles)
ions from deep pyramidal cells (black triangles) of higher
ics implicit in predictive coding. Prediction errors at the i-
xpectations encoded at that level and top-down predictions
diction errors so that they reduce the sum of squared
tailed explanation of these equations and the variables in
e auditory system of a songbird: it shows the putative cells
ision weighted) prediction errors (red arrows) and
ct predictions. In this example, area X sends predictions to
lamus. However, the HVC also sends proprioceptive
syrinx to generate vocalisation through classical reflexes.
the descending predictions of auditory input correspond to
procated with a bottom-up prediction error to ensure
natomy implicit in this schematic should not be taken too
ssage passing scheme onto the key connections among the
tebohm, 2005).
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prediction errors that compete to update expectations in
higher levels. Computationally, this gain corresponds to the
precision or confidence associated with ascending prediction
errors. However, to select prediction errors the brain has to
estimate and encode their precision (i.e., inverse variance).
Having done this, prediction errors can then be weighted by
their precision so that only precise information is assimilated
at high or deep hierarchical levels. The dynamic and context-
sensitive control of precision has been associated with
attentional gain control in sensory processing (Feldman &
Friston, 2010; Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2013) and has
been discussed in terms of affordance in active inference and
action selection (Cisek, 2007; Frank, Scheres,& Sherman, 2007;
Friston et al., 2012). Crucially, the delicate balance of precision
at different hierarchical levels has a profound effect on
veridical inference e and may also offer a formal under-
standing of false inference in psychopathology (Adams,
Stephan, Brown, Frith & Friston, 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009).
In (Friston and Frith, 2015) we illustrated the role of preci-
sion in mediating sensory attenuation and its necessary role
in enabling (open loop) motor control during action. See also
(Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards,& Friston, 2013). In brief, this
leads to an alternation between sensory attention and atten-
uation in the actioneperception cycle, which involves a tem-
porary suspension of attention to the consequences of acting
during the act itself: see (Numminen, Salmelin, & Hari, 1999).
We will use the same approach in this paper to model turn
taking (Wilson & Wilson, 2005) in the switching between
speaking (singing) and listening.
2.3. Active inference
Hitherto, we have only considered the role of predictive cod-
ing in perception through minimising surprise or prediction
errors. However, there is another way to minimise prediction
errors; namely, by re-sampling sensory inputs so that they
conform to predictions: in other words, changing sensory in-
puts by changing the world through action. This is known as
active inference (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011). In active
inference, action is regarded as the fulfilment of descending
proprioceptive predictions by classical reflex arcs. In other
words, we believe that we will execute a goal-directed move-
ment and this belief is unpacked hierarchically to provide
proprioceptive, and exteroceptive predictions generated from
our generative or forward model. These predictions are then
fulfilled automatically by minimizing proprioceptive predic-
tion errors at the level of the spinal cord and cranial nerve
nuclei: see (Adams, Shipp, et al., 2013) and Fig. 2. Mechanis-
tically, descending proprioceptive predictions provide a target
or set point for peripheral reflex arcs e that respond by mini-
mising (proprioceptive) prediction errors.
2.4. Perception and learning
The preceding aspects of active inference are concerned with
expectations about hidden states and causes of sensations
and how these expectations minimise prediction error. How-
ever, exactly the same arguments apply to the parameters of
generative models. Model parameters are quantities that donot change over time and encode causal regularities and as-
sociations. Formally, these are the parameters of the func-
tions in Fig. 2. Neurobiologically, the parameters of a
generative model are thought to be encoded by synaptic
connection strengths and their Bayesian updates look very
much like (experience-dependent) associative plasticity that
mediates short and long-term changes in synaptic connec-
tivity: see the Appendix and (Friston, 2008) for details. The
distinction between states and parameters of generative
models induces the distinction between perceptual inference
and learning that proceed over different timescales. Because
parameters do not change with time, they accumulate pre-
diction errors over time and are therefore updated at a slower
timescale. Equipped with a formal description of perceptual
inference and learning, we can now examine the nature of
communication using simulations for any given generative
model. In the next section, we will apply the computational
scheme above to a model of auditory exchange between two
systems that are actively trying to infer each other.3. Birdsong and attractors
This section introduces the simulations of birdsong that we
will use to illustrate active inference and communication in
subsequent sections. The basic idea here is that the environ-
ment unfolds as an ordered sequence of states, whose equa-
tions of motion induce attractor manifolds that contain
sensory trajectories. If we consider the brain has a generative
model of these trajectories, then we would expect to see
attractors in neuronal dynamics that are trying to predict
sensory input. This form of generative model has a number of
plausible characteristics:
Models based upon attractors can generate and therefore
encode structured sequences of events, as states flow over
different parts of the attractor manifold (a subset of states to
which the flow is attracted). These sequences can be simple,
such as the quasi-periodic attractors of central pattern gen-
erators or can exhibit complicated sequences of the sort
associated with itinerant dynamics (Breakspear & Stam, 2005;
Rabinovich, Huerta, & Laurent, 2008). Furthermore, hierar-
chically deployed attractors enable the brain to predict or
represent sequences of sequences. This is because any low-
level attractor embodies a family of trajectories. A natural
example here would be language (Jackendoff, 2002). This
means it is possible to generate and represent sequences of
sequences and, by induction sequences of sequences of se-
quences etc. This rests upon the states of neuronal attractors
at any cortical level providing control parameters for attractor
dynamics at the level below (Kiebel, von Kriegstein,
Daunizeau, & Friston, 2009). In the example below, we will
show how attractor dynamics furnish generative models of
sensory input, which behave much like real brains, when
measured electrophysiologically.
We first reproduce the simulations reported in (Friston and
Frith, 2015) to illustrate the basic nature of the generalised
synchrony induced by predictive coding.We then present new
results showing that the acquisition of this synchrony
emerges naturally, when two predictive coding schemes try to
predict each other. This acquisition resolves the hermeneutic
Fig. 3 e Schematic showing the construction of a generative model for birdsongs. The upper panel illustrates the generative
model that comprises two Lorenz attractors, where the higher attractor delivers a control parameter (cyan circle) to a lower
level attractor, which, in turn, controls a synthetic syrinx to produce amplitude and frequency modulated stimuli. This
stimulus is represented as a sonogram in the right panel. The equations represent the hierarchical dynamic model in the
form described in the Appendix.
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shared sensory consequences. A more detailed description of
the birdsong model can be found in (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).1 For people interested in the technical details e and exploring
the effects of changing parameters e the routines generating the
figures in this paper are available as part of the academic SPM
freeware (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Annotated Matlab
routines can be run and edited by invoking a graphical user
interface (by typing DEM) and selecting Birdsong duet (DEM_
demo_duet.m).3.1. A synthetic songbird
The example used here deals with the generation and recog-
nition of birdsongs. We imagine that birdsongs are produced
by two time-varying states that control the frequency and
amplitude of vibrations of the syrinx of a songbird (Fig. 3).
There is an extensive modelling effort using attractor models
to understand the generation of birdsong at the biomechan-
ical level (Mindlin & Laje, 2005). Here, we use attractors to
provide time-varying control over the resulting sonograms.
We drive the syrinx with two states of a Lorenz attractor, one
controlling the frequency (between two to five KHz) and the
other controlling the amplitude or volume. The parameters of
the Lorenz attractor were chosen to generate a short sequence
of chirps every few hundred milliseconds or so. The Lorenz
form for these dynamics is a somewhat arbitrary choice but
provides a ubiquitous model of chaotic dynamics in the
physical (Poland, 1993) and biological (de Boer & Perelson,
1991) sciences.
To give the generative model a hierarchical structure, we
placed a second Lorenz attractor, whose dynamics were an
order of magnitude slower, over the first. The first state of the
slow (extrasensory) attractor provided a control parameter
for the fast (sensory) attractor generating the sonogram. In
fluid dynamics, this control parameter is known as a Rayleigh
number and reflects the degree of convective or turbulent
flow, which we will associate with dynamical prosody. In
other words, the state of the slower attractor changes the
manifold of the fast attractor. This manifold could range
from a fixed-point attractor, where the states collapse to
zero; through to quasi-periodic and chaotic behaviour asso-
ciated with a high Rayleigh number. Because higher statesevolve more slowly, they modulate the chaotic behaviour of
the sensory attractor, generating songs, where each song
comprises a series of distinct chirps. As shown in Fig. 3, the
Rayleigh number linking hierarchical levels depends on a
model parameter q that controls the influence of the higher
attractor over the lower attractor. High values of this
parameter increase the dynamical prosody of the song
(inducing successive bifurcations: see Fig. 4). We will use this
parameter later to demonstrate perceptual learning and
closure of the hermeneutic circle.3.2. Omission and violation of predictions
To illustrate the predictive nature of predictive coding,
perceptual inference was simulated by integrating the above
scheme. Formal details of the generative model and integra-
tion scheme are provided in the equations in Fig. 3 and the
Appendix respectively.1 A more detailed description of this
simulation can be found in a companion paper (Friston and
Frith, 2015). In brief, a sonogram was produced using the
above composition of Lorentz attractors (with q ¼ 1) and
played to a synthetic bird e who tried to infer the underlying
hidden states of the sensory and extrasensory attractors
(associated with the HVC and area X respectively). Crucially,
we presented two songs to the bird, with and without the final
chirps. The corresponding sonograms and percepts (pre-
dictions) are shown with their prediction errors in Fig. 5.
The left panels show the stimulus and percept, while the
right panels show the stimulus and responses to omission of
parameter
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Fig. 4 e Bifurcation diagram showing the dependency of
the dynamics on the model parameter. This diagram plots
the maxim and minima of a bird's auditory expectations
(of hidden sensory states) over 1 sec of simulated time
(while singing to itself). This was repeated for 128 values of
the parameter ranging from 0 to 1. The ensuing lines show
a succession of bifurcations, indicating the emergence of
new peaks or transients in the song trajectory. As the
parameter falls to zero, the first level attractor is effectively
disconnected from the higher attractor and ceases to show
chaotic behaviour. The vertical red line shows the value of
the parameter we will use later to illustrate learning.
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nomena. First, there is a vigorous expression of prediction
error after the song terminates prematurely. This reflects the
dynamical nature of inference because, at this point, there is
no sensory input to predict. In other words, the prediction
error is generated entirely by descending predictions. It can be
seen that this prediction error (with a percept but no stimulus)
is larger than the prediction error associated with the third
and fourth chirps that are not perceived (stimulus but no
percept). Second, there is a transient percept when the
omitted chirp should have occurred. As noted in (Friston and
Frith, 2015), this simulation of omission-related responses as
measured with ERPs (Bendixen, SanMiguel, & Schr€oger, 2012)
is particularly interesting, given that non-invasive electro-
magnetic signals arise largely from superficial pyramidal cells.
These are the cells thought to encode prediction error (Bastos
et al., 2012).4. A Duet for one
We now turn to the perceptual coupling or communication by
simulating two birds that can hear themselves (and each
other). Each bird listened for 2 sec, with a low proprioceptiveand a high exteroceptive precision (log-precisions of 8 and 2
respectively) and then sang for 2 sec, with high proprioceptive
and attenuated auditory precision (log-precisions of 0 and -2
respectively). The log-precisions at the higher level were fixed
at 4. Crucially, when one bird was singing the other was
listening. This turn taking (Wilson &Wilson, 2005) is a natural
consequence of active inference because attending to the
consequences of action interferes with descending pre-
dictions about movement e predictions that are generated
before their consequences are evident. There are many ex-
amples of the implicit sensory attenuation during self-made
acts (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013). A physiological
illustration can be found in (Agnew, McGettigan, Banks, &
Scott, 2013), who show that articulatory movements atten-
uate auditory responses to speech using fMRI. Furthermore,
recent TMS studies suggest that the motor system plays an
explicit role in semantic comprehension (Schomers, Kirilina,
Weigand, Bajbouj, & Pulvermuller, 2014). We illustrated the
importance of sensory attenuation in the context of simulated
birdsong in (Friston and Frith, 2015) by showing sensorimotor
delays e implicit in articulating a song e destroy the songs
dynamical prosody. This means, the birds can only listen or
sing but not do both at the same time.
We initialised the simulations with random expectations.
This meant that if the birds cannot hear each other, the
chaotic dynamics implicit in their generative models causes
their expectations to follow divergent trajectories, as shown in
Fig. 6. However, if we move the birds within earshot, so that
they can hear each other, they synchronise almost immedi-
ately. See Fig. 7. This is because the listening bird is immedi-
ately entrained by the singing bird to correctly infer the
hidden (dynamical) states generating sensations. At the end of
the first period of listening, the posterior expectations of both
birds approach identical synchrony, which enables the
listening bird to take up the song, following on fromwhere the
other bird left off. This process has many of the hallmarks of
interactive alignment in the context of joint action and dialogue
(Garrod & Pickering, 2009).
Note that the successive epochs of song are not identical.
In other words, the birds are not simply repeating what they
have heard e they are pursuing a narrative prescribed by the
dynamical attractors (central pattern generators) in their
generative models that have been synchronised through
sensory exchange. The example in Fig. 7 highlights the fact
that the songs articulated by both birds have a rich dynamical
vocabulary (including frequency glides, low frequency war-
bles and amplitude modulated chirps) that is anticipated and
reciprocated during the exchange. This means that the birds
are singing from the same hymn sheet, preserving sequential
and hierarchical structure in their shared narrative. It is this
phenomenon e due simply to generalised (in this case iden-
tical) synchronisation e that we associate with
communication.
Technically speaking, this simulation of communication
shows that two identical dynamical systems e that are pre-
dicting each other e necessarily show identical synchronisa-
tion. In the language of measure-preserving dynamical
systems, generalised synchronisation implies the existence of
a randomdynamical attractor called a synchronisation manifold.
The synchronisation manifold is just a set of states to which
Fig. 5 e Omission-related responses: The left panels show the original song and responses evoked. The right panels show
the equivalent responses to omission of the last chirps. The top panels show the stimulus and the middle panels the
corresponding percept in sonogram format. The interesting thing to note here is the occurrence of an anomalous percept
after termination of the song on the lower right. This corresponds roughly to the chirp that would have been perceived in
the absence of omission. The lower panels show the corresponding (precision weighted) prediction error under the two
stimuli at both levels. These show a burst of prediction error when a stimulus is missed and at the point that the stimulus is
omitted (at times indicated by the arrows on the sonogram). The solid lines correspond to sensory prediction error and the
broken lines correspond to extrasensory prediction error at the second level of the generative model.
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3136states are attracted to and thereafter occupy. The simplest
example of a synchronisation manifold would be the identity
line on a graph plotting homologous states from each system
against each other (e.g., the dashed line in Fig. 8). This corre-
sponds to identical synchronisation. Crucially, the attractor
(which contains the synchronisation manifold) generally has
a lowmeasure or volume. Ameasure of the attractor's volume
is provided by its measure theoretic entropy (Sinai, 1959).
Although formally distinct from information theoretic entropy,
both reflect the volume of the attracting set or manifold. This
means that minimising prediction errors or free energy (in-
formation theoretic entropy) reduces the volume (measure
theoretic entropy) of the random dynamical attractor(synchronisation manifold); thereby inducing generalised
synchrony. The synchronisation in the example above is
identical because both birds share the same generativemodel.
In the next section, we will illustrate generalised synchroni-
sation using simulations were the birds have different models
e and how they learn each other's model to produce identical
synchronisation.
4.1. Summary
In summary, these simulations show that generalised syn-
chrony is an emergent property of coupling active inference
systems that are trying to predict each other. It is interesting
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Fig. 6 e A soliloquy for two. In this simulation, two birds with the same generative models e but different initial
expectations e sing for 2 sec and then listen for any response. However, the birds cannot hear each other (because they are
too far apart) and the successive epochs of songs diverge due to the sensitivity to initial conditions implicit in these (chaotic)
generative models. The upper panel shows the sonogram heard by the first (red) bird. Because this bird can only hear itself,
the sonogram reflects the proprioceptive predictions based upon posterior expectations in the HVC (middle panel) and area
X (lower panel). The posterior expectations for the first bird are shown in red as a function of time e and the equivalent
expectations for the second bird are shown in blue. Note that when the birds are listening, their expectations at the first
level fall to zero e because they do not hear anything and auditory input is attended (i.e., has a relatively high precision).
This does not destroy the slower dynamics in area X, which is able to generate the song again after the end of each listening
period. Note also that the second (blue) bird takes a few hundred milliseconds before it starts singing. This is because it
takes a little time for the posterior expectations to find the attractor manifold prescribed by the higher level control
parameters.
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3 137to consider what is being predicted in this context: the sen-
sations of both birds are simply the consequences of some
(hierarchically composed and dynamic) hidden states. But
what do these states represent? One might argue that theycorrespond to some fictive construct that drives the behaviour
of one or other bird to produce the sensory consequences that
are sampled. But which bird? The sensory consequences are
generated, in this setting, by both birds. It therefore seems
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Fig. 7 e Communication and generalised synchrony. This figure uses the same format as Fig. 6; however, here, we have
juxtaposed the two birds so that they can hear each other. In this instance, the posterior expectations show identical
synchrony at both the sensory and extrasensory hierarchical levels e as shown in themiddle and lower panels respectively.
Note that the sonogram is continuous over successive 2 sec epochs e being generated alternately by the first and second
bird.
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3138plausible to assign these hidden states to both birds and treat
the agency as a contextual factor (that depends on sensory
attention and attenuation). In other words, from the point of
view of one bird, the hidden states are amodal, generating
proprioceptive and exteroceptive consequences that are
inferred in exactly the same way over time; irrespective of
whether sensory consequences are generated by itself or
another. The agency or source of sensory consequences is
determined not by the hidden states per se e but by fluctua-
tions in sensory precision that underlie turn taking. In this
sense, the expectations are without agency e they are neither
yours nor mine, they are our expectations.5. Closing the hermeneutic cycle
In this final section, we consider how shared narratives
emerge as a natural consequence of perceptual learning
driven by, and only by, the minimisation of prediction errors
or free energy. Using free energy minimisation, Yildiz, von
Kriegstein, and Kiebel (2013) have shown that a hierarchy of
nonlinear dynamical systems can learn speech samples
rapidly and recognize them robustly, even in adverse condi-
tions. Here, we pursue the same theme but when two birds
learn from each other; specifically focussing on sensorimotor
Fig. 8 e Perceptual learning during communication. Upper panel: this shows epoch by epoch changes in the posterior
expectations (lines) of the parameter of the first bird (blue) and second bird (green). The shaded areas correspond to 90%
(prior) Bayesian confidence intervals. The broken lines (and intervals) report the results of the same simulation but when
the birds could not hear each other. The lower panels show the synchronisation of extrasensory (higher) posterior
expectations for the first (left panel) and subsequent (right panel) exchanges respectively. This synchronisation is shown by
plotting a mixture of expectations (and their temporal derivatives) from the second bird against the equivalent expectations
of the first bird, where this mixture is optimised assuming a linear mapping.
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3 139learning during which individuals learn to vocalise: see
Bolhuis & Gahr (2006) for discussion of birdsong learning. In
brief, we repeated the above simulations but reduced the first
bird's parameter. This reduces the sensitivity to top-down
modulation and suppresses the prosody and richness of the
lower attractor. This introduces an asymmetry that precludes
identical synchronisation and induces prediction errors that
drive learning. This learning corresponds to (epoch by epoch)
changes in the posterior expectations of the parameter. In
principle, when and onlywhen the parameters are the same is
prediction error (free energy) minimised; at which point
identical synchronisation should emerge. This effectivelycloses the hermeneutic cycle to enable precise
communication.
Technically, this sort of perceptual learning is a difficult
problem and it took us several tries to find a parameterisation
that could be learned efficiently. This is because the inference
scheme has to estimate unknown parameters in the context
of hidden states that also have to be inferred. Furthermore,
the generative model is not only dynamical and nonlinear but
chaotic. The example we chose is fairly arbitrary but sufficient
to show that a biologically plausible inference scheme can
solve this class of learning problem. Our particular parame-
terisation focuses on the link between the sensory and
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3140extrasensory attractors and can therefore be regarded as a
translation of a narrative into a dynamical vocabulary. This
means that our two birds start off with a different mapping
between (the same) high-level narrative and the way it is ar-
ticulated. To understand each other, they have to learn each
other's mapping (i.e., vocabulary).
In detail, the first bird's parameter was reduced to q ¼ 0.5,
while leaving the second bird's parameter at q¼ 1. This means
the second bird retained a rich prosody, in relation to the first.
After each bird sang to the other, their parameters were
updated using a simple form of Bayesian belief updating: the
prior expectation was replaced by the posterior expectation
(retaining a prior precision of 64). The results of this learning
are shown in Fig. 8. The upper panel shows the trajectory of
the parameter for both birds over 32 (1 sec) exchanges. It can
be seen that the parameters of both birds converge towards
each other, so that they both come to articulate a relatively
rich sequence of songs. With successive exchanges, the
parameter of the first bird (blue line) approaches that of the
second bird (green line) and synchronisation emerges (lower
right panel). The excursions from the synchronisation mani-
fold during the first exchange highlight the initial difficulties
the birds have in predicting each other fluently.
This acquisition and maintenance of this rich discourse
can be contrasted with the equivalent learning when the birds
cannot hear each other. The resulting trajectories are shown
as dashed lines and demonstrate that both birds lose the ca-
pacity to maintain their Rayleigh number or dynamical pros-
ody. This is because learning occurs predominantly during
listening, when the precision of auditory prediction errors
(that drive learning) is not attenuated: note the step-like
changes in the parameters. However, when they are
listening, each bird only hears silence, which is best explained
by an attractor with a Rayleigh number of zero (see Fig. 4). In
this situation, both birds emit progressively simpler, low-
frequency warbles that disappear by about the 16th ex-
change (results not shown).
Taken together, these simulations illustrate the circular
causality inherent in communicative inference and learning.
In other words, one needs to infer or predict a structured
sensory exchange before learning can occur; while learning is
necessary to render sensory exchanges predictable. Further-
more, although the second bird appears to teach the first bird
when they hear each other, both are teaching each other e as
evidenced by the fact that the second bird ‘forgot’ how to sing
when it could not hear the first. The simulations should not be
taken as proof of concept of these points; they simply illus-
trate the sorts of phenomena that can emerge when dynam-
ical systems are trying to predict and learn from each other.
5.1. Summary
This section has illustrated perceptual learning as a key pro-
cess in facilitating communication and generalised synchrony
in coupled active inference schemes. In this context, predic-
tion errors implicit in the (neurobiologically plausible) pre-
dictive coding implementation of active inference are drivingboth expectations about hidden states and the learning of
model parameters. This means there are two hermeneutic
timescales: the first subtending synchronisation and percep-
tual inference about hidden states of theworld and the second
slower perceptual learning of the parameters governing fluc-
tuations in the hidden states. The endpoint is a mutual pre-
dictability that is underwritten by a convergence of the
(parameters of) generative models subtending predictions.
Although a simple example, these simulations provide proof
of principle that perceptual learning is a sufficient explanation
for the emergence of generalised synchrony.6. Conclusion
The treatment above builds on the ideas introduced by
(Friston and Frith, 2015); namely, that generalised synchrony
e or synchronisation of chaos e provides a formal metaphor
for communication and is a natural consequence of active
inference. The contribution of the current paper is to show
that the same principle (minimisation of free energy or pre-
diction error), also explains the convergent evolution of hier-
archical models that generate mutually sympathetic
predictions. We have considered this convergence in terms of
perceptual learning that closes the hermeneutic cycle.
There are many issues that we have not considered in
the domain of neural hermeneutics and communication.
Among these is the possibility that we are equipped with
multiple generative models that can be deployed depending
upon the situation in which we find ourselves, or the person
that we are communicating with. In this instance, the se-
lection of an appropriate generative model e that approxi-
mates the model selected by you e would be better
understood in terms of Bayesian model selection or aver-
aging (FitzGerald, Dolan, & Friston, 2014). This is an inter-
esting possibility that speaks to inferring the context in
which we are communicating and who we are communi-
cating with. This represents another (hierarchical) inference
problem. The model selection perspective is interesting
because, if correct, it implies a multilateral internal model
of how we behave that is entirely dependent upon who we
are communicating with. In turn, this begs the question of
agency and how it is represented in generative models. For
example, if our conceptual narratives are context-sensitive
and truly shared, am I the same person (in my mind)
when speaking to you, as opposed to somebody else?
Furthermore, if I do not have a narrative (or appropriate
mapping to a vocabulary) that corresponds to your narrative
(or mapping), will I ever be able to communicate with you?
This is where perceptual learning comes into its own;
enabling the acquisition of new narratives (and vocabu-
laries) or repurposing of existing models; e.g., (Adank,
Hagoort, & Bekkering, 2010; Skoe, Krizman, Spitzer, &
Kraus, 2014). However e as anyone who has tried to learn
a foreign language can testify e learning can be a difficult
and slow process, especially for Englishmen like us.
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This brief description of generalized predictive coding is based
on (Feldman& Friston, 2010). Amore technical description can
be found in (Friston, Stephan, Li, & Daunizeau, 2010). This
scheme is based on three assumptions:
 The brain minimizes a free energy of sensory inputs
defined by a generative model.
 The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical,
nonlinear and dynamic.
 Neuronal firing rates encode the expected state of the
world, under this model.
Free energy is a quantity from statistics that measures the
quality of amodel in terms of the probability that it could have
generated observed outcomes. This means that minimizing
free energy maximizes the Bayesian evidence for the genera-
tive model. The second assumption is motivated by noting
that the world is both dynamic and nonlinear and that hier-
archical causal structure emerges inevitably from a separa-
tion of spatial and temporal scales. The final assumption is the
Laplace assumption that leads to a simple and flexible
neuronal code.
Given these assumptions, one can simulate awhole variety
of neuronal processes by specifying the particular equations
that constitute the brain's generative model. In brief, these
simulations use differential equations that minimize the free
energy of sensory input using a generalized gradient descent.
_~mðtÞ ¼ D~mðtÞ  v
~m
Fð~sðtÞ; ~mðtÞÞ A.1
These differential equations say that neuronal activity
encoding posterior expectations about (generalized) hidden
states of the world ~m ¼ ðm;m0;m00 ;…Þ reduce free energyewhere
free energy Fð~s; ~mÞ is a function of sensory inputs
~s ¼ ðs; s0; s00 ;…Þ and neuronal activity. This is known as
generalized predictive coding or Bayesian filtering. The first
term is a prediction based upon a differential matrix operator
D that returns the generalized motion of expected hidden
states D~m ¼ ðm0;m00 ;m000 ;…Þ. The second (correction) term is
usually expressed as a mixture of prediction errors that en-
sures the changes in posterior expectations are Bayes-optimal
predictions about hidden states of the world. To perform
neuronal simulations under this scheme, it is only necessary
to integrate or solve Equation A.1 to simulate the neuronal
dynamics that encode posterior expectations. Posterior ex-
pectations depend upon the brain's generative model of the
world, which we assume has the following hierarchical form:s ¼ gð1Þxð1Þ;vð1Þþ exp

 1
2
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A.2
This equation describes a probability density over the
sensory and hidden states that generate sensory input. Here,
the hidden states have been divided into hidden states and
causes (x(i), v(i)) at the i-th level within the hierarchical model.
Hidden states and causes are abstract variables that the brain
uses to explain or predict sensations e like the motion of an
object in the field of view.
In these models, hidden causes link hierarchical levels,
whereas hidden states link dynamics over time. Here, (f(i), g(i))
are nonlinear functions of hidden states and causes that
generate hidden causes for the level below ande at the lowest
level e sensory inputs. Random fluctuations in the motion of
hidden states and causes ðuðiÞx ; uðiÞv Þ enter each level of the hi-
erarchy. Gaussian assumptions about these random fluctua-
tions make the model probabilistic. They play the role of
sensory noise at the first level and induce uncertainty at
higher levels. The amplitudes of these random fluctuations
are quantified by their log-precisions ðpðiÞx ;pðiÞv Þ.
Given the form of the generative model (A.2) we can now
write down the differential equations (A.1) describing
neuronal dynamics in terms of (precision-weighted) predic-
tion errors. These errors represent the difference between
posterior expectations and predicted values, under the
generative model (using A$BbATB and omitting higher-order
terms):
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A.3
This produces a relatively simple update scheme, in which
posterior expectations ~mðiÞ are driven by a mixture of predic-
tion errors ~εðiÞ that are defined by the equations of the gener-
ative model.
In neuronal network terms, Equation A.3 says that error-
units compute the difference between expectations at one
level and predictions from the level above (where x(i) are pre-
cision weighted prediction errors at the i-th level of the hier-
archy). Conversely, posterior expectations are driven by
prediction errors from the same level and the level below.
These constitute bottom-up and lateral messages that drive
c o r t e x 6 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 2 9e1 4 3142posterior expectations towards a better prediction to reduce
the prediction error in the level below. In neurobiological
implementations of this scheme, the sources of bottom-up
prediction errors are generally thought to be superficial py-
ramidal cells, because they send forward (ascending) con-
nections to higher cortical areas. Conversely, predictions are
thought to be conveyed from deep pyramidal cells by back-
ward (descending) connections, to target the superficial py-
ramidal cells encoding prediction error (Bastos et al., 2012;
Mumford, 1992).
The corresponding updates for the parameters follow a
similar scheme; however, because parameters are time-
invariant we have a simpler gradient descent that effectively
accumulates free energy gradients over time:
_~mqðtÞ ¼ v~mSð~s; ~mÞ
vtS ¼ Fð~sðtÞ; ~mxðtÞ; ~mvðtÞ; ~mqÞ
A.4
Here, Sð~s; ~mÞ is the anti-derivative of free energy (known as
free action). Neurobiologically, when expressed in terms of
prediction errors, the solution to Equation A.4 corresponds to
associative plasticity. See (Friston, 2008) for details.r e f e r e n c e s
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